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Back to Geo-Social Futures
The concept of the Anthropocene, the so-called
geological age of man, has become pervasive in
recent years, marking one of those rare
instances when an idea from the natural
sciences gains wider purchase on the popular
imagination, as evolution, thermodynamics, and
Gaia have before it. Although the concept
remains contentious within the Earth sciences –
the International Commission on Stratigraphy is
debating whether it should be adopted within the
scientific periodization of the Earth’s history –
for the moment this appears no obstacle to its
growing popularity across domains that typically
have little truck with geology, including of course
the art world, where it remains a favored
curatorial device, and academia, where it is the
subject of innumerable conferences and
symposia. Whether or not it will turn out to be a
concept of enduring significance or a passing
intellectual meme remains to be seen, but a
growing body of critique is emerging from within
both the humanities and the environmental
movement.
          Much of this critical discussion on the
Anthropocene has thus far focused on
highlighting the ways in which appeals to the
agency of a supposedly universal “Anthropos”
conceal the historically specific forms of social
power that have resulted in Earth systems
change.1 Stratigraphic debate in the Earth
sciences about identifying appropriate markers
for its origins is increasingly shadowed by
debates in the humanities that locate its
emergence with European colonialism, the
development of industrial capitalism, or Cold
War nuclear militarism. Some have suggested
that “Capitaloscene” is a better designation,
given the fundamental role played by global
capitalism in transforming the planetary
environment, while others are calling for the
“decolonization” of the Anthropocene.2 Indeed
such debates have fed back into the Earth
sciences, where scientific controversies have
themselves become politicized, with, for
example, a recent paper published in Nature by
Simon Lewis and Mark Maslin of University
College London suggesting that evidence exists
for locating the origins of the Anthropocene in
the European colonization of the Americas.3 Less
remarked upon has been what geo-social futures
may be possible and desirable in light of these
contested entanglements of social and
geological histories.
          It is now common to find geo-social futures
evoked within the horizon of extinction. A recent
scientific paper arguing that there is no longer
any doubt that the Earth is undergoing its sixth
mass extinction was widely reported upon in
mainstream media, but this was only the latest
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Harvey Ball, creator of the smiley face, autographs posters in his office on July 6, 1998.
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in a slew of ominous warnings issued by eminent
research institutions.4 Although the prospect of
imminent extinction might provide fodder for
cheap nihilism, and imagining The Earth After Us
arguably aids awareness of just how grave the
consequences of anthropogenic environmental
change may be, it is perhaps more urgent and
fruitful to address how to live with and through
seemingly inevitable catastrophic environmental
change.5 It is important to remember that (to
paraphrase what William Gibson has said of “the
future”) environmental catastrophe is already
here – it’s just not evenly distributed. For many,
environmental devastation is a lived reality
rather than a matter of philosophical speculation
or apocalyptic foreboding, let alone long-term
planning. Hence, questioning geo-social futures
not only implies imagining extinction, or
“learning how to die,” but also thinking about
how best to collectively organize life in light of
the uneven responsibilities for, and
vulnerabilities to, anthropogenic planetary
changes already well underway.6
“We Have Seen What We Can Do, and It’s
Awesome”
In June 2015 the “new environmentalist” think
tank The Breakthrough Institute hosted a three-
day conference on the theme of “The Good
Anthropocene” at its headquarters in Oakland,
California. The conference brought together
natural and social scientists and popular science
writers including Diane Ackerman, Steve Fuller,
Bruno Latour, and Mark Lynas, as well as one of
their harshest critics, the Australian
environmentalist Clive Hamilton. Given that, for
many, including Paul Crutzen – the climate
scientist who popularized the term – the
Anthropocene is a concept indicating the
profound depth of the planetary environmental
crisis, it may seem counterintuitive to prefix it
with the deeply oxymoronic adjective “good.” But
shaking up conventional environmental thinking
was one of the aims.
          The idea of the good Anthropocene
originated with Erle Ellis, a landscape ecologist
at the University of Maryland and a senior fellow
at The Breakthrough Institute. Ellis advocates
what he calls “postnatural environmentalism”
and argues that we should “forget Mother
Nature” and recognize that “this is a world of our
making.”7 He claims that “nature is gone,” and
that humans have shaped the natural
environment for millennia, even at the planetary
scale.8 Thus, Ellis advises liberating ourselves
from pious mystifications about a pure, wild
nature that existed before the modern period,
and suggests that “rather than look back in
despair [we] look ahead to what we can
achieve.”9 For him, the Anthropocene means that
we are “living on a used planet,” that there is “no
returning to our comforting cradle,” and that,
rather than an occasion for regret, this presents
an opportunity to celebrate human ingenuity:
“We have seen what we can do, and its
awesome,” he wrote in 2011.10 According to Ellis,
if we first “stop trying to save the planet,” then
we can embrace the Anthropocene and our new
role as “the creators, engineers, and permanent
global stewards of a sustainable human nature”
– and he insists that “we” does mean all of us.11
          For Ellis, postnatural environmentalism
raises important but neglected questions: “Can
we create a good Anthropocene? In the distant
future will we be able to look back with pride?”12
Like all visions of the future, Ellis’s optimistic
concept of a geo-social future where humans
can be proud of an “artificial earth” is based on
his understanding of the past.13 Ellis is a
prominent advocate of the controversial early
Anthropocene hypothesis, which traces humans’
planetary impact to the advent of agriculture
some eight thousand years ago. For Ellis, the
early Anthropocene legitimates the good
Anthropocene, because if humans have always
shaped the natural environment, however
unintentionally, then there is nothing essentially
different about intentionally managing the entire
planet as technical capacities increase. He
assures us that, “we humans can totally trash
the planet and still survive. We already have in
many ways.”14 The logical sleight of hand upon
which Ellis’s argument hinges and by which he
seeks to jump scale without complication is, of
course, glaring: rice farming, therefore
geoengineering.
          Ellis’s good Anthropocene has been
welcomed by those associated with so-called
new environmentalism or eco-pragmatism. New
environmentalism is not a formally organized
movement but rather a loosely related
assemblage of thinkers and institutions who,
despite differences, share common ideas: the
eclipse of “wild” nature; conservation as the
production rather than the salvation of nature;
technological progress as the key to sustainable
environments; marketizing nature as a key
element of environmentalism; the rejection of
scarcity as a necessary horizon; the capacity of
human ingenuity to transcend planetary
boundaries; and the rejection of much of what
has traditionally been identified as
environmentalism.15 Indeed, these thinkers
adopt the idea of “planetary stewardship” not as
a difficult yet necessary task in the face of
looming catastrophe, but as a calling to embrace
humanity’s role as planetary masters.16 Mark
Lynas starkly expressed this attitude at the Good
Anthropocene conference:
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In 2014, a thirty-six-year-old
wooden roller coaster in
Valencia, California dramatically
caught fire and partially
collapsed.
For the essential truth of the Anthropocene
is this: neither God nor Gaia is in charge. We
are. We now get to decide everything from
the pH of the oceans to the temperature of
the biosphere to the very composition and
future evolutionary path of life on Earth.
Ducking or denying this responsibility will
not make it go away. By virtue of our global
influence, we have landed ourselves with
this awesome task of planetary
management. The Anthropocene is best
understood not as a passive state, but an
active one.17
It should be emphasized that these debates are
not confined to obscure corners of academic
conjecture but operate across different public
forums, shaping policy around topics like climate
change, conservation, energy technologies, and
economic development.18 Despite the global
ambition of these discussions, for the most part
they remain deeply US centric, but this is
precisely the reason for their outsize cultural and
political influence.
          The idea of the good Anthropocene was
given a major publicity boost in 2014 when New
York Times journalist Andrew Revkin blogged
about a keynote speech where he took up the
idea. Revkin argued that “with work … we can
have a successful journey this century … We are
going to do OK.”19 He was sharply rebuked by
Hamilton in a series of stinging articles where he
claimed that those “who argue for the good
Anthropocene are unscientific and live in a
fantasy world of their own creation.”20
The idea of the good Anthropocene is based
on a fundamental misreading of science. It
arises from the failure to make the
cognitive leap from ecological thinking –
the science of the relationship between
organisms and their local environments –
to Earth system thinking, the science of the
Whole Earth as a complex system beyond
the sum of its parts.21
Hamilton argued that the good Anthropocene is a
depoliticizing narrative that works to perpetuate
the interest of those conservative forces working
determinedly to prevent action on climate
mitigation and renewable energy. “It ignores the
fundamental problem here, and that is the
exercise of political power to stop governments
from imposing policies that will facilitate the
transition to the low-carbon future.”22
          This controversy was rekindled with the
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publication of the The Ecomodernist Manifesto, a
pamphlet laying out a rose-tinted new
environmentalist vision of the “Great
Anthropocene” that can be achieved by turning
away from conventional environmentalist
principles.23 Published by The Breakthrough
Institute, it carried signatures from a long list of
affiliates, including Ellis and Lynas. The
manifesto repeats Ellis’s interpretation of the
early Anthropocene hypothesis, affirming that
the “Earth is a human planet” and that
“humankind’s extraordinary powers” can be used
“in service of creating a good Anthropocene,”
while the idea of “fixed physical boundaries to
human consumption” is declared to be “so
theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant.” A
good Anthropocene, the manifesto declares,
“demands that humans use their growing social,
economic and technological powers to make life
better for people, stabilize the climate, and
protect the natural world.” To this end, the
manifesto’s central claim is that intensifying
industrial food production and expanding nuclear
energy would require less land and provide
greater material well-being for an increasing
global population, allowing the “decoupling [of]
human development from environment impacts”
so that “humanity’s material dependency upon
nature might be less destructive.” Thus,
intensifying technological development will allow
economic growth to be unburdened of
environmental costs. Indeed, the manifesto
argues that “meaningful climate mitigation is
fundamentally a technological challenge,” a
matter of inevitable technical innovation rather
than a question of political will and cooperation.
          The manifesto has drawn a wide array of
critiques from environmentalists and eco-critics,
including, unsurprisingly, from the perspective of
degrowth.24 Hamilton issued a scathing attack
on the manifesto, highlighting how it blatantly
disregards established climate science on
ideological grounds, instead putting faith in an
“old-fashioned American technofix” to solve the
problems of climate change – a type of techno-
fetishism that is, Hamilton argues, only possible
because politics has been emptied out of the
manifesto’s account of the world.25 Bruno Latour
likewise noted the absence of the political:
“From the Manifesto I get enthusiasm, anger,
dressing downs, but I don’t get politics.”26
Echoing his recent turn to the work of Carl
Schmitt, Latour scolds the “ecomoderns” for
their antagonistic deficit:
You should be able to define your friends
and your enemies. Who are you fighting?
Who are you allying yourself with? What are
the amity lines you want to draw? I keep
hearing talks against those who want to
have or to impose limits. But … drawing
limits between friends and enemies is what
politics is all about.27
Further, he points out that the manifesto is
“written entirely as if humans were still alone on
the stage,” and hence assumes an anachronistic
conception of the division between Man and
Nature that fails to engage with the complex
“reality of entanglement” the Anthropocene has
revealed. Hence, according to Latour, not only is
the manifesto missing politics, but it fails to
provide any basis upon which political thinking
may be “able to absorb the Anthropocene,
namely the reaction of the Earth system to our
action, in a way that renders politics again
comprehensible.”28 Hence, for Latour as for
Hamilton, the “Good Anthropocene” imagined by
The Breakthrough Institute and its new
environmentalist fellow travelers is an
ideological mirage that places faith in a future of
seamless eco-technological ease rather than
addressing the tensions of the political. As such,
Hamilton notes, it is “system compatible” with
the headlong rush of the status quo into
devastation.29
Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the
Will?
At the Good Anthropocene conference, Lynas
advised environmentalists that “there is nothing
so liberating as letting go of your pessimism,”
and insisted that the difference between “the
‘worst of times’ planet [and] the ‘best of times’
planet” is principally a matter of attitude.
Likewise the authors of The Ecomodernist
Manifesto state that “we embrace an optimistic
view towards human capacities and the
future,” and Ellis has asked “what good is
environmentalism if it makes you depressed
about the future?” Hamilton rebuts this
optimism on two fronts. Firstly, he says that it is
a sunny form of aggression used as a “means of
gaining the moral upper hand.”30 Secondly, that it
is grounded in and promotes a faulty view of
reality shaped by a quasi-religious belief in
technological progress. In the view of
ecomodernists, “the only barrier to a grand new
era for humanity is self-doubt and the
‘pessimism’ of gloomy scientists … The Power of
positive thinking can’t turn malignant tumors
into benign growths, and it can’t turn planetary
overreach into endless lifestyle improvements.”31
          Similarly, Latour highlights that for
ecomodernists, “catastrophism [is] a sort of
human ideology imposed on a situation that
would remain, in itself, fairly quiet and stable,
let’s say fairly Holocene.”32 However,
environmental catastrophe is, Latour cautions,
not imaginative fancy, “but a reality that blind
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Pope Francis snuggles a baby lamb at the living nativity scene at a church outside Rome on January 6, 2014. The Huffington Post, January 7, 2014.
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faith in outmoded conceptions of progress
cannot exorcize.” For Latour, such optimism is a
dangerous delusion:
Wake up you ecomoderns, we are in the
Anthropocene, not in the Holocene, nor are
we ever to reside in the enchanted dream of
futurism … As usual, those who fight
against apocalyptic talk and catastrophism
are the ones who are so far beyond
doomsday that they seriously believe that
nothing will happen to them and that they
can continue forever, just as before.33
It may be hard to disagree with Hamilton’s and
Latour’s assessments; however, there seems to
be a risk here for eco-critics, particularly those
of the Left: necessary critique of the false
optimism peddled by The Breakthrough Institute
and their ilk might lead to a rejection of optimism
as such – a risk that a pessimistic orientation
towards geo-social futures will become the
default setting for Leftist environmentalism. It
may seem that pessimism as a philosophical
stance is the preserve of only a few scattered
fringes of contemporary intellectual life – the
“dark ecology” promoted in Paul Kingsnorth’s
Dark Mountain project, the “cosmic pessimism”
of Eugene Thacker, the “antinatalism” of Jim
Crawford, which was given a popular platform by
the television show True Detective, or even the
anonymous anarchist text Desert. Yet confining
ourselves to this list would be to recognize
pessimistic orientations only where they are
explicitly declared, when in fact pessimism
towards geo-social futures seems to be a much
more common stance, even if it appears in
nuanced, more qualified forms.34 If we think of
pessimism as an affective sensibility, or even an
aesthetic disposition, as opposed to a
theoretically articulated – or even consciously
held – position, it might be considered more
prevalent in Leftist thought than some may care
to admit.
          The problem with pessimism from a
political perspective is that it is not very
conducive to forging collectives around shared
projects and common struggles. Indeed, this may
be the point – to let hot air out of inflated dreams
– but a pessimistic sensibility seems more likely
to cultivate politically debilitating affects, such
as melancholic paralysis and resignation in the
face of existing forms of power, or even to fuel
fears. However unintentionally, pessimism can
tacitly legitimate the lessons of individualized
quietude taught by conservatives who tell us that
the “small, happy life” offers deliverance from
the dangerous delusion of collective
transformation.35 Just as blind optimism risks
lubricating existing forms of power, an equally
blind pessimism risks stunting the collective
capacities required to oppose them.
          Optimism remains a crucial affective
resource for galvanizing political struggles,
particularly important in forging enduring
alliances across plural collectives dispersed in
space and diverse in ethos – exactly the type of
articulations needed to ensure more socially just
and ecologically sustainable geo-social futures.
This is why it is crucial not to cede optimism to
reactionary forces or dismiss it as utopian
naïveté. Without some basic acceptance of the
idea that through collective effort our relations
with one another and the planet can be
transformed for the better, why would we act at
all? Rejecting this possibility would be to
consent to an existence that is all stick and no
carrot, a purely defensive life governed by ad hoc
reactions, that would elevate the contingent
ideology of neoliberal individualism into an
inescapable anthropological fact and reduce
each of us to a little Katechon securing the best
worst option until shit really hits the fan.
Adopting a worldview from which all optimism
has been expunged would in effect naturalize the
existing catastrophic trajectories of global
capitalism and militarized colonialism as
inevitable and accept that indeed “there is no
other way,” not due to faith in the brilliance of the
plan but because of a lack of recognition that
collective capacities may challenge it.
          Yet if some form of optimism is to be
embraced, then the question with regard to geo-
social futures is whether a distinction can be
made between those who locate optimism in
existing trajectories of global capitalism –
accepting a depoliticized account of the
relationship between social and natural
processes and uncritically positing technological
development as the medium of social progress
for a universal humanity – and those who locate
optimism in struggles already under way against
these very same trajectories – arguing that
despite the brutality, dislocations, and
extinctions of modernization, it has also
produced the conditions, platforms, and
capacities from which other worlds and new
collectives might be born, even within the
wreckage of all that has been lost. I would
hazard to say that these distinct modes of
optimism can and should be distinguished.
However, while rejecting the false optimism of
The Breakthrough Institute may be relatively
easy, articulating alternative conceptions of
optimism within the present politico-planetary
horizon is a task fraught with tension.
          Optimism implies a certain assessment of
the possibilities for beneficial change (or
continuity) over time, but how is historical
change to be conceived at a geo-social juncture
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marked by the collision of social and Earth
histories? And who may it be beneficial for? How
does this unprecedented planetary-scale
convergence of social and environmental
processes impact our ability to tie political
struggles, and political affects such as optimism,
to actions and aims? The vector of inevitable
progress along which the moderns’ optimism was
plotted has now buckled under pressure from
externalities that can no longer be ignored, and
its promise of a better future is no longer clear.
The planetary stage upon which world history
was to be played out has itself entered the
drama of the political, contorting the neutral
spatial environment through which the arrow of
progress was believed to pass. In light of these
new historical conditions heralded by the
concept of the Anthropocene (or Capitaloscene,
Plantationocene, Chthulucene, Gynocene,
Manthropocene, whichever is preferred for the
moment), the whole armory of concepts,
practices, subjects, and relations with which
modern politics has been mapped must be
retooled.36 Optimism is no exception. Optimism
can no longer operate within the horizon of a
secularized paradise and the promise of
perfection – whether of justice, freedom, or
comfort – but must remain committed to
betterment within planetary conditions almost
inevitably set to worsen, however unevenly and
unsteadily. The better geo-social future that
hope and struggle must be oriented towards
might now be defined in terms of less bad.
Though it remains necessary to cultivate
optimism as a political affect, it has been robbed
of some of its traditional emotional charge,
mirroring the ambiguous state of geo-social
futures.
          Even if the Left’s position on geo-social
futures is to embrace optimism, it must do so in
such a way that the collective capacity to mourn
what has been lost is not forgotten in the rush to
blast open the doors of heaven. Cultivating the
conditions for optimism must not be confused
with celebrating a sunny machismo. I agree with
those who insist that the Left must reclaim its
orientation to the future (even if the conception
of history this future implies remains uncertain),
but this should not come at the expense of
repressing collective grief and forgetting mutual
care, modes of relation that cannot be
compensated for with militant gusto but which
will be necessary if any better world is to truly be
better.37 Further, even if optimism means
resisting the secularized eschatology of
catastrophism, it does not mean spinning the
yarn that everything will be okay, and certainly
not that all problems simply require the correct
tools (“a shoddy workman blames his tools,” as
they say). Far too often in Leftist political thought
a false dichotomy is imposed between techno-
critics and techno-utopians. Seeing the potential
role of technology in achieving the aims of the
Left’s politics or for guaranteeing a better geo-
social future does not necessarily make one a
techno-utopian, but this is all too often the
assumption, with critics jumping to the
conclusion that those who see benefits in
infrastructure and advances in biological
science, chemistry, and engineering must also be
advocates of Monsanto and geoengineering, or
must regard forms of indigenous knowledge as
expendable primitivism.
          Much of this absurdity arises because these
conversations too often revolve around the
metaphysically inflated phantom of Technology
as such rather than engaging the specific ways in
which particular technologies are put to use for
certain ends within distinct social assemblages.
While the assumption that technology is
inherently bad should certainly be rejected, this
does not imply that technology is inherently good
or even neutral. Concern would be more
productively focused on questioning what
particular technologies do, how they are used, by
whom, to what end, and how open they are to
repurposing. Obviously, not all technologies are
vectors of liberation – but equally clear is that
they are not all apparatuses of instrumental
reason that ensnare us ever more deeply in webs
of control and alienate us from our authentic
being. Breaking with these inflated critiques of
technology on the Left does not imply a
necessary break with the principles of
environmentalism, as in The Ecomodernist
Manifesto. Rather, it means taking a more sober
approach to the question of how technologies
may play a part in transforming socio-ecological
relations so that the impact of social formations
on local ecologies and Earth systems is reduced,
notably by employing already existing renewable
energy technologies to replace fossil fuels and
nuclear power, as most mainstream
environmentalists argue.
          What makes the ecomodernists techno-
utopian is not that they argue that technologies
can play a role in reducing anthropogenic
environmental destruction, but that they depict
the obstacles to serious action to this end as
technological rather than political, and suggest
that if the world could just wait until the right
technologies are developed then everything
would be okay. In fact, many of the relevant
technologies already exist; what is absent is
political will to implement their development and
use. It is not a utopian politics but a utopia that
lacks politics.
          It seems, then, that with regard to geo-
social futures, it might be apt to adopt a
Gramscian position: “pessimism of the intellect,
e-
fl
ux
 jo
ur
na
l #
65
 S
U
P
E
R
C
O
M
M
U
N
IT
Y 
—
 m
ay
–
au
gu
st
 2
01
5 
  R
or
y 
R
ow
an
Ex
ti
nc
ti
on
 a
s 
U
su
al
?:
 G
eo
-S
oc
ia
l F
ut
ur
es
 a
nd
 L
ef
t O
pt
im
is
m
08
/1
1
10.19.15 / 14:11:48 EDT
optimism of the will” – even if today the category
of “will” too is uncertain, when the “end of Man”
has pronounced the sovereign subject dead and
the “end of Nature” declared a new era of multi-
agental complexity. Despite contending visions
of geo-social futures, it seems essential for the
Left today to insist that pessimism is not the
necessary correlate to the militant commitment
to justice, care, and freedom, and that optimism
must be cultivated, not despite worsening geo-
social conditions, but precisely because of them.
Without a commitment to the enduring
possibility of a better world, we simply resign
ourselves, and the planet, to extinction as usual.
          ×
Rory Rowan is a post-doctoral researcher at the
Geography Department at the University of Zurich. 
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